SLWUTAH, L.C v. Jerry W. Griffiths and Juna E. Griffiths : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1997
SLWUTAH, L.C v. Jerry W. Griffiths and Juna E.
Griffiths : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ross C Anderson; Anderson and Karrenberg; Attorneys for Appellees.
Jeffery L Silvestrini; Cohne, Rappaport, Segal, P.C.; Attorneys for Appellnats.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, SLWUTAH, L.C v. Jerry W. Griffiths, No. 970497 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1029









Case No. 970497-CA 
APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA 
Ross C. Anderson 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Attorneys for Appellees 
50 West Broadway, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini (Bar No. 2959) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Attorneys for Appellants 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801)532-2666 
ARGUMENT PRIORITY: 15 




K F U 
50 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
APR 2 2 1998 
Julia D'Alesendro 
Clerk of the Court 
.A i 0 fiL *-» -~ . i ~ -^> 











 11S1. NO 'W049/-CA 
APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
JUDGE ANNE M. STERBA 
Ross C. Anderson 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Attorneys for Appellees 
50 West Broadway, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini (Bar Mo. ZV59) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Attorneys for Appellants 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801)532-2666 
ARGUMENT PRIORITY 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page No. 
RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS vii 
ARGUMENT 1 
I. EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE WAS UTILIZED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT, AND SUCH EVIDENCE WAS DISPUTED. THIS 
RENDERS THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IMPROPER 1 
H. THE TRIAL COURT MISINTERPRETED THE LEASE 
AGREEMENT 5 
HI.. PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY ASSURE THAT THE TRIAL COURT*S 
RULING SHOULD BE OVERTURNED 14 
IV. SLW HAS A DUTY TO REPLACE THE ROOF 16 
CONCLUSION 17 
i 
TABLE OF CASES, STATUTES AND AUTHORITIES 
Page No. 
Cases 
American Trust Co. v. Truck Ins. Exchange. 305 P.2d 73, 74 (Cal. App. 1957) 7 
Avalez Hotel Corp. v. Milner Hotels. 87 So.2d 63 (Miss. 1956) 11 
Dennison v. Marlowe. 744 P.2d 906 (N.M. 1987) 15 
Expert Corp. v. La Salle Nat'l Bank. 496 N.E. 2d 3 (111. App. 1986) 6 
Fashion Place Inv.. Ltd. v. Salt Lake County/Salt Lake County Medical Health. 776 P.2d 
941, 943 (Utah App. 1989) cert, denied 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989) 2 
First Sec. Bank of Utah. N.A. v. Maxwell. 659 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Utah 1983) 15 
Friedman v. Le Noir. 241 P.2d 779 (Ariz. 1952) 8 
Home Sav. & Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.. 817 P.2d 341 (Utah App. 1991) 8 
Leonardi v. Furman. 316 P.2d 487 (Ariz. 1957) 8, 9 
Luckv Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark. 755 P.2d 750, 752 5, 14 
Miller v. Belknap. 266 P.2d 662, 665 (Idaho 1954) 11 
Mobil Oil Credit Corp. v. DST Realty. Inc.. 689 S.W.2d 658 
(Mo. App. 1985) 6, 7, 11, 15, 16 
Ouebe v. Davis. 586 N.E.2d 914 (Ind. App. 1992) 6 
R & R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries. Inc.. 936 P.2d 1068 2 
Records v. Briggs. 887 P.2d 864, 871 (Utah App. 1994) 1-3 
Richard Barton Enterprises. Inc. v. Tsern. 928 P.2d 368, 376 (Utah 1996) 17 
ii 
Sandleman v. Buckeye Realty. Inc.. 576 N.E.2d 1038 (111. App. 1991) 6 
Santillanes v. Property Management Services. 716 P.2d 1360, 1364 
(Idaho App. 1986) 
Scott v. Prazma. 555 P.2d 571 (Wyo. 1976) 6, 15, 16 
Sears v. Riemersma. 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982) 5 
Shum v. Gaudreau. 562 A.2d 707, 715 (Md. App. 1989) 11 
Southeast Banks Trust Co. v. Higginbotham Chevrolet-Qldsmobile. Inc.. 445 Si 
(Fla. App. 1984) 9 
Thomas W. Garland. Inc. v. Rubin. 493 S.W.2d 74 (Mo.App. 1973) 11 
Utah State Med. Ass'n. v. Utah State, et. al.. 655 P.2d 643 (Utah 1982) 8 
Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner. 636 P.2d luou, - 12 
Wade v. Jobe. 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991) 17 
Warburton v. Va. Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan. 899 P.2d 779, 782 (Utah App. 1995) 5, 7 
Washington Hydroculture. Inc. v. Payne. 635 J'.JU I ,i,X (Wash. 1981) 7 
Wattles v. South Omaha Ice & Coal Co.. 69 N.W. 785 (1897) 7 
Williams v. Melby. 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985) 17 
Wolfe v. White. 225 P.2d 729 (Utah 1950) 9, 10 
Other 
Utah R.Civ. P. 56 13 
Hi 
RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following responses to SLW's "Statement of Facts" correspond numerically to 
those enumerated by SLW. These responses are necessary to show that SLW's facts are 
either in dispute or attempt to introduce extrinsic evidence in order to affirm the trial court's 
decision to grant SLW's Motion for Summary Judgement. 
1. SLW's references to the purchase of the premises are inadmissible extrinsic 
evidence, and should not be considered for purposes of this appeal. 
2. The "Purchase Agreement" referred to in paragraph 2 is extrinsic evidence and 
should not be considered for purposes of this appeal. This Purchase Agreement was also 
introduced to the trial court on SLW's Motion for Summary Judgment, to which introduction 
the Griffiths objected. Griffiths' Reply Memorandum, R. 113-119. This objection was never 
addressed by the trial court. This extrinsic evidence is not admissible to uphold the decision 
of the trial court. 
3. The Griffiths incorporate response no. 2 as if fully set forth herein. The 
Purchase Agreement is extrinsic evidence. 
4. The Griffiths incorporate response no. 2 as if fully set forth herein. The 
Purchase Agreement is extrinsic evidence. 
5. Paragraph 5 mischaracterizes the statements made by Jerry Griffiths in his 
affidavit. The Griffiths found out this information during the course of the lease, after they 
iv 
had moved onto the premises. See (First) Affidavit of Jerry Griffiths, p.2, R. at 45. This 
statement is therefore disputed by the Griffiths. 
7. SLW is correct that all facts must be determined in favor of the Griffiths. 
However, SLW's footnote to this statement is improper and untrue. The timing of the 
problems experienced with the roof of the premises is genuinely disputed by the parties. 
Compare (First) Affidavit of Jerry Griffiths, p.2, R. at 145, to Affidavit of Scott Schirmer, 
p.2, R. at 91. 
8. SLW's statement that, "the roof required total restoration or replacement in 
order for it to be kept in repair or put into repair", is not a statement of fact, but a conclusory 
argument. This statement is inappropriate, and is also disputed by the Griffiths. 
11. The Griffiths dispute that the Lease Agreement "unqualifiedly" requires 
maintenance and repair. Rather, as argued to the trial court and in the Griffiths Appellate 
Brief, Article 4.2 of the Lease Agreement qualifies and modifies the duty to repair. See 
Griffiths' Appellate Brief, pp.26-32. 
13. The statement made by SLW in paragraph 13 is not a fact, but a conclusion of 
law. Furthermore, this contention is disputed by the Griffiths. 
v 
ARGUMENT 
L EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE WAS UTILIZED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT, AND SUCH EVIDENCE WAS DISPUTED. THIS 
RENDERS THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IMPROPER. 
The Griffiths have noted controlling Utah law which unequivocally states that, ffwhen 
contract interpretation will be determined by extrinsic evidence of intent, it becomes a 
question of fact". Records v. Briggs. 887 P.2d 864, 871 (Utah App. 1994). In their Appellate 
Brief, the Griffiths argued that the trial court ignored this rule of contract interpretation by 
allowing extrinsic evidence to alter the terms of the contract itself. SLW argues that the trial 
court did not utilize extrinsic evidence in its analysis, and therefore followed the proper rules 
of contract interpretation. 
SLW's analysis is belied, however, by the language used by the trial court in its 
opinion, and by the arguments made by SLW in its memoranda submitted to the trial court 
as well as in its Appellate Brief. The language utilized by the trial court, and that used by 
SLW itself, affirm two of the Griffiths' contentions: 1) that the trial court took into account 
extrinsic evidence in its decision to grant SLW's motion for summary judgment, and; 2) that 
SLW cannot put forth an argument sustaining the trial court's decision without resort to 
extrinsic evidence. 
"[W]hen [a] trial court relies on extrinsic evidence to interpret a contract, [the] 
appellate court can affirm summary judgment only if the undisputed material facts, 
concerning parties' intent, demonstrate [the] successful litigant's position is correct as a 
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matter of law". Records v. Briggs. 887 P.2d at 871(emphasis added), citing Fashion Place 
Inv.. Ltd. v. Salt Lake County/Salt Lake County Medical Health. 776 P.2d 941, 943 (Utah 
App. 1989) cert denied 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989). See also R & R Energies v. Mother Earth 
Industries. Inc., 936 P.2d 1068 (When contract is unambiguous, intention of parties must be 
determined from words of agreement.) The trial court in this case did not make clear that it 
did not take into account extrinsic evidence. Indeed, it would have been simple enough for 
the trial court to do so, by expressly ruling on the Griffiths' objection to the introduction of 
extrinsic evidence by SLW. Instead, the trial court began its very brief opinion with the 
statement that: 
The plaintiff contends that it is not liable because this is a net lease and that, 
as such, the landlord will only receive a fixed rent without any other charges. 
R. at 215. 
Whether the Lease Agreement was a "net" lease was directly disputed by the parties, 
and an answer to this question cannot be found within the terms of the Lease Agreement 
itself. Rather, to prove the Lease Agreement was a "net" lease, SLW introduced extrinsic 
evidence to show the "real" intentions of the parties, and what the Lease Agreement "really" 
meant - that "repair" actually meant "replace". See SLW's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgement and in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for 
Summary Judgment, R. at 71-84. Each allegation of extrinsic facts made by SLW to prove 
the parties intended a "net" lease was disputed by the Griffiths. See Griffiths' Reply 
Memorandum, pp. 8-14, R. 113-119. 
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After incorporating this "net" lease language into its opinion, without any remark as 
to the Griffiths' objection to such language, the trial court went on to state that there were, 
"no material facts in dispute", and found that, "as a matter of law...the phrase [tenant shall 
maintain and keep in repair and shall put in repair, when necessary, a wall and roof of the 
building] is clear and unambiguous...[and] it seems to me the only other meaning that the 
phrase has is to replace...". R. at 215 (emphasis added). 
The trial court could not have reached this conclusion without considering - and, in 
fact, believing as true - SLW's extrinsic evidence as to the "real" intentions of the parties to 
create a "net" lease. That the trial court did so is evident in a number of ways. First, SLW's 
argument that a "net" lease was intended was incorporated into the trial court's decision as 
laid out above. Second, SLW's briefs to the trial court were replete with references to 
extrinsic evidence in an attempt to show that the parties meant something other than "repair". 
Third, the trial court made no ruling on the Griffiths' objections to such evidence. Fourth, 
the trial court found that "repair" had to mean something "other" than "repair". If the Lease 
Agreement was truly "unambiguous" as found by the trial court, the trial court simply did not 
have the liberty to redefine "repair" as something "other" than its ordinary meaning and 
usage. Under the rules of contract interpretation, such liberties could only be taken if 
undisputed extrinsic evidence showed that this was actually the parties' intention. Records 
\^Bnggs, 887P.2dat871. 
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SLW is apparently unable to defend the decision of the trial court without continuing 
references to extrinsic evidence in its Appellate Brief. SLW relies upon extrinsic evidence 
in the following ways: 1) SLW has repeatedly argued its position based upon a Purchase 
Agreement, which is not part of the Lease Agreement, at pages 3, 4, 7, 27, and 32 of its 
Appellate Brief; 2) SLW apparently feels compelled to advance extrinsic "evidence" that 
Jerry Griffiths purportedly could foresee that the roof might require replacement during the 
term of the Lease Agreement at p. 28 of its Appellate Brief; and 3) SLW cannot resist 
offering other "evidence" as to the parties' intentions, at pages 4, 7, 27, 28, and 32 of its 
Appellate Brief. This extrinsic evidence is used by SLW to attempt to sustain the trial court's 
interpretation. However, such evidence is not only disputed, but impermissibly interferes 
with the interpretation of a purportedly "unambiguous" document. SLW cannot show that 
extrinsic evidence was not utilized by the trial court in its interpretation of the Lease 
Agreement in question. Instead, all evidence shows that the trial court did indeed consider 
such evidence, and, in fact, believed such evidence in favor of SLW. This led the trial court 
to alter or redefine the meaning of "repair" - precisely what SLW argued for in its briefs to 
the trial court. This was impermissible as a matter of law. The trial court must either ignore 
all such evidence, or in the event that such evidence is disputed, allow the parties to present 
such issues at trial. Since neither occurred here, the decision of the trial court should be 
reversed. 
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n. THE TRIAL COURT MISINTERPRETED THE LEASE AGREEMENT. 
The Griffiths argued in their Appellate Brief that even if the trial court had not 
impermissibly used extrinsic evidence in its decision to grant SLW's motion for summary 
judgment, the trial court nevertheless misinterpreted the Lease Agreement as a matter of law. 
SLWfs argument against this contention consists mainly of citations to nineteenth century 
literature and attempts to distinguish the case law cited by the Griffiths1 in nonsensical ways. 
Neither of these responses succeeds in upholding the trial court's decision to redefine "repair" 
as "to replace". Therefore, this Court should overturn the trial court's decision. 
As shown here and in the Griffiths' Appellate Brief, the trial court was simply not 
entitled to redefine either "maintain", "put in repair" or "keep in repair" as "replace" unless 
the parties intended these words to have a meaning other than their normal usage. As the 
Griffiths have discussed, supra, any such intentions are directly disputed, and cannot serve 
to uphold the trial court's grant of SLW's motion for summary judgment. Since the intentions 
of the parties cannot change the terms of the contract, these terms must be given their 
ordinary and usual meaning. Warburton v. Va. Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan, 899 P.2d 779, 782 
(Utah App. 1995). If there is any question as to what these terms mean, such question must 
be answered in favor of the Griffiths, because SLW wrote the Lease Agreement in question, 
Sears v. Riemersma. 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982), and because all facts must be answered in 
favor of the nonmovant upon a motion for summary judgment. Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. 
v. Clark. 755 P.2d 750, 752. 
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The Griffiths cited numerous cases which state that a covenant to repair - in whatever 
form - does not translate as a duty to make replacements. See, e.g., Sandleman v. Buckeye 
Realty, Inc.. 576 N.E.2d 1038 (111. App. 1991); Mobil Oil Credit Corp. v. DST Realty. Inc.. 
689 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. App. 1985); Scott v. Prazma. 555 P.2d 571 (Wyo. 1976); Expert Corp. 
v. La Salle Nat'l Bank. 496 N.E. 2d 3 (111. App. 1986); Ouebe v. Davis. 586 N.E.2d 914 (Ind. 
App. 1992). These cases show that when parties to a lease place a covenant to repair upon 
a tenant, even if the covenant describes the tenant's obligation as to "keep in repair" or "put 
in repair/' this does not entail or envision that the tenant will have to replace portions of the 
premises. These cases note that such replacements would not have been within the 
contemplation of the parties, and would be a fundamentally unfair burden to impose upon a 
tenant. Id. 
SLW attempts to distinguish each of these cases. However, it appears that the only 
method by which SLW can do so is to argue that each of these courts simply misinterpreted 
the respective leases at issue, or to be more exact, failed to interpret the respective leases as 
SLW now interprets them. See, e.g., SLWfs Appellate Brief at p. 18 ("the court resorted to 
dictionary definitions of the word 'repair* as if the word were used in an entirely different 
manner than actually used in the lease agreement"). SLW also attempts to distinguish certain 
of these cases because a general repair clause was used between the landlord and tenant 
there, instead of one specifying a particular portion of the premises. However, this is another 
distinction without a difference. A general covenant to make "all repairs", such as that found 
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in Mobil Oil Credit Corp.. supra, would entail a greater effort on the part of a tenant than one 
more limited as in the Lease Agreement at issue. In short, SLW simply does not like the 
holdings of the cases cited above. These holdings should guide this court to make a similar 
decision - that a covenant to repair does not equate to a covenant to replace, and that the trial 
court's decision to the contrary is therefore incorrect as a matter of law. 
There are three phrases within Article 4 of the Lease Agreement which describe the 
duties of the Griffiths: (1) "Tenant shall maintain" and, (2) "keep in repair" and , (3) "put 
into repair where necessary". See Lease Agreement, p.2, R. at 50. None of these phrases 
explicitly include "replacements". Nevertheless, SLW attempts to argue that, 
notwithstanding the case law cited by the Griffiths' (as well as common sense) to the 
contrary, the ordinary meaning of each of these phrases includes replacement. This simply 
is not the case, and certainly is not the "ordinary and usual meaning of the words used." 
Warburton. 899 P.2d at 782. 
"The plain meaning of maintain or repair is not synonymous with rebuild. 'Repair' 
means 'to amend, not to make a new thing'... 'Maintain'does not mean 'rebuild!" Washington 
Hydroculture. Inc. v. Payne. 635 P.2d 138 (Wash. 1981) (emphasis added), citing Wattles v. 
South Omaha Ice & Coal Co.. 69 N.W. 785 (1897). Other courts agree with this analysis. 
"To maintain means to repair or keep in good condition things that exist, and not the creation 
of something new." American Trust Co. v. Truck Ins. Exchange. 305 P.2d 73, 74 (Cal. App. 
1957). The cases cited by SLW do not state otherwise. 
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SLW cites Friedman v. Le Noir. 241 P.2d 779 (Ariz. 1952), apparently for the 
proposition that "maintain" means "replace". However, the Friedman case actually held that 
adding something new to the property was not a "repair", but was instead an "alteration". Id. 
at 780. Interestingly, a later Arizona decision, Leonardi v. Furman, 316 P.2d 487 (Ariz. 
1957), held that the Friedman case did not stand for the proposition that "repair" meant 
"restore". In Leonardi. the same court which decided Friedman held that, "there is a clear 
distinction between 'repair1 and 'restore1." The court noted that this was particularly true 
when both words are used in the same contract. Id. In the Griffiths' contract with SLW, the 
words "repair" and "replacements" are used. Compare Article 4 of the Lease Agreement, 
R. at 50, with Article 17.5, R. at 55. Therefore, just as in Furman. "this Court is without 
authority to reject these words as surplusage". Id. The presence of the word "replacements" 
meant that the parties knew how to use this word, as opposed to mere "repairs". 
Utah Courts utilize similar interpretative rules. For instance, in Utah State Med. 
Ass'n. v. Utah State, et. al.. 655 P.2d 643 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court held that a 
promise to keep the premises in good condition did not equate to a promise to rebuild: "the 
defendant did not expressly contract to restore the air conditioning system to its original 
condition, but rather promised to keep the system in good condition while in the possession 
of the premises". Id. at 645. Further, in Home Sav. & Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.. 817 
P.2d 341 (Utah App. 1991), the Utah Court of Appeals held that a contract should be 
interpreted in manner to harmonize all of its provisions and terms. Therefore, just as in the 
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Furman decision, Utah Courts must not render contractual terms mere "surplusage" through 
reconstructive interpretations. Here, the trial court failed to follow this rule in its decision to 
grant SLW's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
SLW also cites Southeast Banks Trust Co. v. Higginbotham Chevrolet-Oldsmobile. 
Inc.. 445 So. 2d 347 (Fla. App. 1984). However, this case also fails to prove SLWfs 
argument. In Higginbotham, there was no question as to replacement of the roof, only the 
repair of a leak. Furthermore, the question at issue was whether the repair was structural or 
not under the terms of the contract. Finally, a/w// trial was held so that the court could 
ascertain the intentions of the parties and receive expert opinion as to whether the repair was 
structural. Id. at 348, 349. This case only serves to prove that summary judgment is 
inappropriate in such a case, like that at hand, where the parties dispute what their intentions 
were, and the words of the contract do not necessarily solve this dispute. 
Finally, SLW cites Wolfe v. White. 225 P.2d 729 (Utah 1950) for the proposition that 
"repair" means "replace". However, this case is inapposite for a number of reasons. First, 
the court noted at the beginning of that case that the landlord had submitted an admission to 
the court that it had understood its obligation to include "repair and/or replacement of the 
roofing material". Id. at 730. Further, this case dealt with a landlord's responsibilities to its 
tenants at the beginning of a lease. The court held that, "if the foundation and walls...were 
not in good condition for the purposes of the tenancy at the time the lease began, it was the 
duty of the lessor, under this covenant, to put the walls and foundation in such condition at 
9 
or before the commencement of the lease and keep them so during the term." Id. at 731. At 
trial, a jury found that the lessor provided the lessees with faulty premises from the beginning 
of the term, and that the lessor had not fulfilled its duty to put the premises in repair at the 
outset. Therefore, according to the terms of the lease, the lessor was responsible to do later 
what he should have done at the beginning of the lease. Id. at 731-732. 
This is actually similar to the interpretation that the Griffiths had argued before the 
trial court, and in their Appellate Brief. Due to the presence of the surrender clause (found 
directly below the maintenance clause at paragraph 4.2 of the Lease Agreement), and due to 
the ordinary and usual meaning of "put and keep in repair", the only reasonable interpretation 
of the Lease Agreement was to find that the Griffiths were responsible to "put" the premises 
in repair at the beginning of the lease, and "keep" them so, reasonable wear excepted. See, 
e.g, Griffiths Appellate Brief at p.31.1 The Griffiths, in fact, complied with these 
requirements, and performed repairs from the beginning of the leasehold until that time when 
the roof of the premises could no longer be repaired, but required replacement. It is 
undisputed that "reasonable wear" to the roof necessitated its replacement. Therefore, 
construing the Lease Agreement against the landlord, Wolfe, P.2d at 732, and applying 
reasonable construction to these two provisions, id., the terms of the lease relieve the 
Griffiths of any responsibility for replacement of the roof. 
*As noted in the Griffiths' Appellate Brief, p. 31, the term "put in repair" generally 
means initially, at the beginning of the term. SLWhas not addressed or rebutted this 
point. 
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The Griffiths have noted both in their briefs to the trial court and in their Appellate 
Brief that a surrender clause modifies a covenant to repair. Shum v. Gaudreau. 562 A.2d 
707, 715 (Md. App. 1989); Miller v. Belknap, 266 P.2d 662, 665 (Idaho 1954); Santillanes 
v. Property Management Services, 716 P.2d 1360,1364 (Idaho App. 1986). Ironically, SLW 
criticizes these cases for not reflecting the "recent" trend in case law considering the subject, 
yet, depends on citations from the 1950fs and 1960fs. SLW's citations are not only 
antiquated, but inapposite. First, in Avalez Hotel Corp. v. Milner Hotels. 87 So.2d 63 (Miss. 
1956), the court was dealing with repairs, not replacement. In fact, this difference was 
specifically noted by the court: "if there were extraordinary damage by fire, wind or water 
the lessee was not obligated to repair; but this would be damage which resulted in an 
unusual, partial or total destruction". Id. at 67 (emphasis added). This also serves to 
differentiate Thomas W. Garland. Inc. v. Rubin. 493 S.W.2d 74 (Mo. App. 1973), for, as 
noted in Mobil Oil. "Garland... was decided on the basis the repairs were not of a structural 
nature". Mobil Oil. 689 S.W.2d at 660. 
SLW also argues that the Griffiths seek to leave "no obligation whatsoever for the 
Griffiths to maintain the roof, keep the roof in repair, or put the roof in repair" by arguing 
that the repair clause is modified by the surrender clause. This simply is not true. The 
Griffiths have indeed put the roof into repair, have kept it in repair, and have maintained the 
roof. However, after years of rain, wind and snow, the roof had reached the point where it 
could no longer be repaired, but needed replacement. This replacement was made necessary 
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due to reasonable wear. At this point, the Lease Agreement expressly excepts the Griffiths 
from the costs of replacement. All one needs to do is follow the Lease Agreement from 
Article 4.1 to Article 4.2 to see that this was the intention of the parties. By arguing 
otherwise, it is SLW which is ignoring the terms of the lease, and specifically eviscerating the 
surrender provision, in its analysis. When the trial court followed this analysis, it also ignored 
Article 4.2, and thereby misinterpreted the Lease Agreement as a matter of law. Utah Valley 
Bank v. Tanner. 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-62 (Utah 1981) (each provision of a contract shall be 
given effect, with none ignored). 
SLW makes it particularly clear that both it and the trial court ignored the surrender 
clause of Article 4.2 in part 11(A)(2) of its Appellate Brief. There, SLW claims that the 
covenant to put "in repair" envisions a permanent state, and that "usage of the phrase 'in 
repair' commits the Griffiths to do whatever is required to keep and put the roof in good, 
sound, usable condition without any qualification". See SLW's Appellate Brief, p. 15 
(emphasis in original). However, the parties did include such a condition, in the very next 
paragraph of the Lease Agreement: "The Premises shall be surrendered...reasonable wear 
excepted". See Lease Agreement, Art. 4.2, R. at 50. If SLW is correct, then the surrender 
clause means nothing. This was not the intention of the parties, and completely ignores Utah 
contract law. Further, to support its assertion that the "only accepted use of the phrase" 'put 
in repair' is to describe a state or condition, see SLW's Appellate Brief, p. 16, SLW cites to 
three 19th century sources, two of which include Gulliver's Travels and Mark Twain's 
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Notebook. Use of these literary references ignores both the fact that the use of language 
changes over the centuries, and that none of these sources are recognized legal authority. As 
the Griffiths have shown, modem case law interprets the phrase "in repair" differently than 
"to replace", and, whether a noun, verb or any other grammatic category, does not require 
a tenant to rebuild or restore the landlord's property. 
Replacements were not assigned to the Griffiths by the terms of the Lease Agreement. 
Instead, as noted in the Griffiths1 Appellate Brief, the only time replacements are mentioned 
are in the "repair and deduct" provision of the Lease Agreement in Article 17.5, which 
provision envisions that it is SLW which will be taking care of necessary "replacements". 
SLW is unable to answer the Griffiths1 question which asks, if "repair" actually means "to 
replace", then why is the word "replacement" found within a separate provision of the same 
contract? It is clear that the parties separated repairs from replacements, making the 
Griffiths responsible for the former, and, should the need for replacements arise, providing 
SLW the mechanism to implement them. 
Article 17.5 reads: 
Interruption of Services. Interruption or curtailment of any service maintained 
in the building of which the Premises form a part, or furnished to the Premises, 
if caused by strikes, mechanical difficulties, or any causes beyond Landlord's 
control whether similar or dissimilar to those enumerated, shall not entitle 
Tenant to any claims against Landlord or to a any abatement in rent, nor shall 
the same constitute constructive or partial eviction, unless Landlord fails to 
take such measures as may be reasonable in the circumstances to restore the 
service without undue delay. If the Premises are rendered unfit in whole or 
in part for the uses specified in this Lease Agreement, for a period of more 
than ten days, by the making of repairs, replacements or additions, other than 
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those made with Tenant's consent or cause by misuse or neglect by Tenant or 
Tenant's agents, servants, customers, visitors or licensees, there shall be a 
proportionate abatement of rent during the period of such unfitness. 
Lease Agreement, Article 17.5, R. at 55. The parties knew when to use the term 
"replacements"; they did not use this term when defining the duties of the Griffiths. Since 
any ambiguities must be determined in favor of the Griffiths, there is no basis upon which 
SLW can uphold the trial court's determination that under the Lease Agreement, as a matter 
of law, the Griffiths are responsible for replacements. Therefore, this Court should reverse 
the ruling of the trial court. 
IE. PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY ASSURE THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT'S RULING SHOULD BE OVERTURNED. 
The Griffiths argue in their Appellate Brief that the trial court ignored their equitable 
arguments, and that in doing so, the trial court erred by ruling in favor of SLW as a matter 
of law. SLW has argued that the decision of the trial court was, in fact, equitable, and that 
the replacements necessitated were foreseeable. This argument ignores the fact that the trial 
court's decision was upon a motion for summary judgment, and that all disputed facts must 
be decided in favor of the Griffiths. Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp., 755 P.2d at 752. However, 
SLW cannot support the trial court's decision without resort to disputed evidence. Therefore, 
it becomes obvious that the trial court's decision to grant SLW's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was inappropriate. 
SLW does not, nor cannot contest that under Utah law, if two conflicting 
interpretations of a contract are possible, a court should choose the interpretation which will 
14 
bring an equitable result. First Sec. Bank of Utah. N.A. v. Maxwell. 659 P.2d 1078, 1081 
(Utah 1983). Instead, SLW argues that the trial court's decision was equitable, since the 
Griffiths1 "knew, or certainly should have known, that the roof would require replacement 
approximately 7 years into their 15-year lease". SLW's Appellate Brief at p. 28. This was 
a disputed fact (not to mention extrinsic evidence), which must be decided in favor of the 
Griffiths. Therefore, SLW cannot use the "fact" that replacement of the roof was 
"foreseeable" in order to uphold the trial court's decision as an equitable one. 
SLW further argues that a court may not rewrite a contract in order to address 
concerns of fairness. However, this is not what the Griffiths' argue that this Court should do. 
The contract at issue does not state that the Griffiths are responsible for replacements; the 
trial court should not have inferred otherwise. Rather, the trial court should have chosen an 
interpretation which would have brought about an equitable result, or should have allowed 
the parties to prove their intentions at trial. However, to interpret the contract contrary to its 
express terms, in a manner which essentially makes the Griffiths the insurers of SLW's 
property when such was not intended nor contracted for is simply inequitable, and certainly 
inappropriate upon a motion for summary judgment. See Dennison v. Marlowe. 744 P.2d 
906 (N.M. 1987) ("for lessees to make extensive long-lasting improvements that could likely 
revert to the lessor would be inequitable"); see also Scott v. Prazma. 555 P.2d 571; Mobil 
Oil 689 S.W.2d 658. While a sum of nearly $300,000 may not be "enormously expensive" 
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to SLW, to the Griffiths it is a substantial sum, and is something for which they never 
bargained. 
Therefore, the Griffiths do not request that this Court rewrite their contract; rather the 
Griffiths request that this Court enforce the contract as written, without redefining terms for 
"other" possible meanings. The Griffiths also request that this Court construe the facts in a 
light most favorable to the Griffiths, as a court should on a motion for summary judgment, 
so that if there is any doubt as to the parties' intentions, such doubts are decided in favor of 
the nonmoving party as directed by Utah R. Civ. P. 56. The trial court performed neither of 
these tasks. Therefore, its decision should be reversed. 
IV. SLW HAS A DUTY TO REPLACE THE ROOF. 
SLW would have this Court uphold the trial court's determination by default: that, 
since SLW purportedly has no affirmative duty to replace the roof of the premises, this Court 
should affirm the decision to grant SLW's Motion for Summary Judgment. This analysis 
fails to take into account SLW's duty under principles of equity, and under the lease itself. 
As noted, supra, equity often assigns a duty where absent, unspoken, or unclear from 
the terms of a contract. Scott v. Prazma. 555 P.2d 571: Mobil Oil, 689 S.W.2d 658. If the 
trier of fact finds that, under the circumstances, it would be inequitable for the tenant to act 
as the insurer of the landlords property, or that it would be inequitable for the tenant to 
supply to the landlord something better than the original structure, the fact-finder should hold 
that the landlord then has a duty to make such replacements. Id. Although this is an 
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inappropriate decision to be made upon a motion for summary judgment, it does not mean 
that such decision cannot be made at trial. If the trial court assigns such a duty to SLW, it will 
be bound by this decision. 
Further, SLW simply assumes it does not have a duty to make replacements under the 
Lease Agreement. However, the trier of fact may find that, under all the circumstances, and 
after learning of the intentions of the parties, that Article 17.5 does contemplate that SLW 
will make all replacements. Such a finding would likewise bind SLW.2 
Therefore, the common law does not provide SLW the panacea it seeks. A landlord 
is no longer able to shun its responsibilities to tenants. Rather, principles of equity and 
principles of contract law require that SLW uphold its obligations to the Griffiths. This Court 
2In addition, SLW has ignored the changes in the common law which have 
occurred in Utah courts over the last decade. Although SLW cites the case of Wade v. 
Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991), it fails to note that the Utah Supreme Court changed 
the common law in that case by establishing that a residential landlord owed an implied 
duty of habitability, and that the covenant to pay rent was dependent on the lessor's 
compliance with that duty. Id. at 1010. This warranty is equally applicable in commercial 
leases. Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern. 928 P.2d 368, 376 (Utah 1996). The 
Tsern Court noted that Utah cases have progressively shunned the common law, 
particularly in the case of Williams v. Melby. 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985) (where the Utah 
Supreme Court held that certain property law rules that historically governed the leasing 
of land had become obsolete), and that, "the lessee's rights, liabilities and expectations are 
more appropriately viewed as governed by contract and general principles of tort law". Id. 
at 375. Indeed, the Lease Agreement itself is, in part, a product of this new focus on 
contract principles, as Article 17.5 expressly incorporates the right of the tenant to deduct 
rent for periods of time when the premises are unfit. Therefore, even if Wolfe v. White 
was not distinguishable, its strict adherence to the common law would no longer apply. 
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should see that such obligations are fulfilled by reversing the lower court's decision to grant 
SLWs Motion for Summary Judgment, and remanding for trial on the merits. 
CONCLUSION 
SLW is unable to argue in affirmation of the decision of the trial court without resort 
to extrinsic evidence, or evidence which should be weighed in favor of the Griffiths on a 
motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, SLW is unable to show that the trial court 
correctly interpreted the contract at issue. Finally, SLWs arguments that the common law 
protects all landlords from any responsibility for replacements is inaccurate. The Griffiths 
should be allowed the benefit of their contract, and at the very least, to prove to a fact-finder 
what the parties intended by that contract. For each of these reasons, the decision of the trial 
court should be overturned. 
DATED t h i s ^ c l a y of April, 1998. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini 
Attorneys for the Griffiths 
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